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I dedicate this thesis to Oanh, without whom I would still operate under the comforting 
assumption that I had achieved a complete realization, thinking of ethics as little more 
than a tragic joke. 
 
“Life doesn‟t want to be healed. The negative therapeutic reaction is fundamental to it. 
Anyway, what is healing? The realization of the subject through a speech which comes 
from elsewhere, traversing it.” 
-Jacques Lacan, Seminar II, p. 233
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This thesis examines the complex role of ethics within Psychoanalytic theory, finding not 
a prescriptive ethics, but a reference to ethics in the cathartic methodology that I argue 
underpinned Psychoanalytic thought from the very beginning. The introduction provides 
the reader with the necessary background to the material to be covered. The first 
chapter examines the neglectful attitude found throughout the foundational writings of 
Psychoanalytic theory in the work of Sigmund Freud, as well as covering two different 
methods by which ethics are often reduced, and which Freud successfully avoided. The 
second chapter seeks the origin of an alternative ethics in the traditional locus of 
freedom and agency: the ego, and explains how this assumption is problematic. The 
ego is shown to be surmounted through the cathartic method. The final chapter 
examines the processes of post-egoic ethics, shows their role in the Psychoanalytic 









INTRODUCTION: THE PLACE OF CATHARSIS IN PSYCHOANALYSIS 
We may characterize Psychoanalysis as a cathartic practice1, insofar as it seeks 
to discharge the pathologies of everyday life in order that free activity and association 
might take their place2. “Catharsis” is a Greek term, which translates to “purification” or 
“purging”, and refers in the context of Psychoanalysis to an abreaction/discharge of a 
fundamental and pathogenic trauma (Laplanche & Pontalis, p. 60). This method, 
although discarded in later formulations of Psychoanalytic theory, remained implicit in all 
of them, insofar as they continued to emphasize the direction of Psychoanalysis as 
guided by a desire for exteriority; a desire to exit a closed and stifling circuit. The 
oppressiveness of psychoanalytic theory is precisely an attempt to escape this element 
of experience by delineating it. Sigmund Freud‟s notorious emphasis on sexuality and 
familial relations was a result of his discovery that the ossifications of desire, in 
pathological states, follow certain patterns that lead to pathology through their constant 
repetition. In the case of neurotics, who make up the vast majority of psychoanalytic 
subjects, certain thought and behavioral patterns, often solidified at a young age, are 
repeated incessantly, and this leads to psychological disturbance. The goal of 
Psychoanalysis was (and is) not to inculcate these patterns, but to offer a path beyond 
them, towards a true relation with the world and others in their exteriority, and without 
sacrificing interior life to do so.  
Psychoanalysis, like any meaningful system, has the potential to take us well 
beyond impersonal duty and personal compulsion into a more broad, responsible, and 
                                                          
1
 In spite of Freud‟s surpassing of the cathartic method to form the method later referred to as the “talking 
cure”, an emphasis on the curative potential of catharsis, re-named “abreaction”, remained in his later 
work, and remained a core principle of psychoanalysis. 
2
 Although Psychoanalysis achieves its cure through free association, free association is also a sign that it has 





open-ended universe. This, as I will put forth in the pages that follow, lays the 
groundwork for a true ethical practice and eliminates the twin possibilities of false ethics, 
dedicated to top-down moralistic injunction, as well as to the bottom-up interior drives 
which form a kind of “private despotism” reigning over the interior life of the afflicted. 
If there is a process by which ethical spaces are opened up through 
psychoanalysis, it would be through catharsis. The cathartic abreaction, which empties 
the psyche of its excess cathexes, is a terrifying prospect for many who are initially 
exposed to Psychoanalytic theory and method, in that it makes explicit many of the less 
comfortable processes and objects involved in our day-to-day lives. The insights 
provided us by its theory of pathology (in this singular focus on pathology, 
Psychoanalysis was from its beginning a primarily negative theory, delineating 
pathological states, with ideals always remaining on the periphery), have a tremendous 
potential to arouse the fear of the philosopher or the philosophically minded.  With its 
scalpel, it peers under the goodness that is assumed to be provided us by our loyalty to 
prescriptive formulas of ethics, to see if there is a hidden pattern of unconscious activity. 
The possibility of a return of the repressed, or a perceptible uprising of unconscious 
patterns, is a constant threat, and the higher we value our ideals, the more inaccessible 
their sources seem, the less likely we are to acknowledge the possibility of this 
occurring. Layers of distortion often cover the activity of the unconscious, placed as they 
are with the goal of preventing disruptive material from entering conscious awareness. 
When they do enter consciousness, they are often cloaked in reversals, denials, and 
other means of obfuscating their true nature. The only way to peer beneath these 





most common “masks” of unconscious activity, because it allows one to continue one‟s 
activities unmodified while reassuring oneself of the justification of one‟s practices within 
greater society. Ethics easily takes on a ritualistic character, becoming a form of 
sacrifice of freedom encoded in widespread discourse. Through ritualistic compulsion, 
the neurotic gives up their agency in order to reach regress comfortably to a stage of 
primal dependency or omnipotence (this will be discussed at length in Chapter 3). The 
language of the unconscious, however, stands out from these distortions involved in 
traditional ethical discourse in that it “[…] speaks all by itself […]” (OSP, p. 70), while 
traditional discursive ethics speak for us, offering us a static means to measure our level 
of conformity to its codes and prescriptions. Although it is clear that ethics must involve 
autonomy on one level or another, most ethical systems end up undermining this 
autonomy by bringing them entirely into the domain of representational consciousness. 
Pathology represents a troubling surfacing of this autonomy, this lack of representation.   
Yet the goal of Psychoanalysis is not to decompose ethics by revealing its roots 
in pathology. Instead, Psychoanalysis as it was initially set forth by Sigmund Freud and 
further developed by Jacques Lacan, allows for the expansion of the study of ethics 
beyond their usual confinement to conscious representation and into the domain of the 
non-representational unconscious. By exploring the relationship of the unconscious to 
ethical behavior, we can illustrate the possibility of ethics beyond prescriptivity, beyond 
the rules that limit freedom. As is indicated by Freud throughout his writings, we may 
find the inverse of what we would expect in the ethical by studying their practice and 
their pathos, in that it is easy to sweep ethics up into the pre-ethical desires of the 





understood, we cannot make any assumptions about the veracity of any ethical system 
supposedly subscribed to by an individual:  
If anyone were to put forward the paradoxical proposition that normal man is not 
only far more immoral than he believes but also far more moral than he knows, 
Psycho-analysis, on whose findings the first half of the assertion rests, would 
have no objection to raise against the second half (EI, p. 42).  
Although the engagement psychoanalysis and ethics throughout Freud‟s work is almost 
exclusively negative, with him mounting sophisticated critiques and exposés of the 
embarrassing failures of ethics, it seems clear in the above quotation that he is not 
unilaterally opposed to a positive ethics, as long as it can account for the unconscious 
dynamics involved. One can speculate that Freud himself avoided going too far in this 
direction on account of his fear of making his work susceptible to a construction of a 
positive ethics capable of undoing his work on the unconscious. For the purposes of this 
thesis, however, I have chosen to focus on a positive element in Freud‟s thought, 
namely the cathartic underpinning of his theory‟s trajectory, which I see as linked to an 
unspoken ethical impulse contained in the theory itself. 
The cathartic method, utilized in early Freudian theory, provides us with a vital 
path towards an explication, however paradoxical this may seem, of a powerful, positive 
gesture towards ethics in the practice of Psychoanalysis, and this gesture may in fact 
turn out to be more important than the specific elements of ethical practice itself3. After 
all, we find good and bad people who subscribe to the entire spectrum of ethical beliefs. 
                                                          
3
 It is important to note that the reference towards ethics does not imply either a positive or negative conception 
of ethics, but rather discovers the ethical as the space which opens up during the course of psychoanalytic 
treatment in which a previously inconceivable relation becomes possible between the ideal and the concrete, the 





It would seem then, that what matters in the practice of goodness is not specifically 
which rules are followed, but how they are followed, in what context, and this, the 
virtuousness, the goodness, which is directly connected to the ideal that drives it, 
cannot be taught (as Socrates so thoroughly describes in the Meno dialogue). We find 
this gesture, or this reference towards ethics with a noteworthy absence of didacticism, 
throughout the Psychoanalytic literature, but most noticeably in the work of Sigmund 
Freud and Jacques Lacan. It remains an aporetic gesture, pointing towards something 
hopelessly irresolvable, from a position which is even more irresolvable.   
In what follows, I will attempt to continue this gesture, this reference, and 
emphasize its profound significance for both the practice of Psychoanalysis as well as 
ethical discourse in general. As a gesture, however, it is entirely different from the 
prescriptive injunction provided throughout the ages in almost all post-Platonic 
philosophy. It indicates that Psychoanalysis itself is not an ethical institution, and yet 
every aspect of its practice and theory tends in this direction. As is the case with any 
therapeutic system, it seeks to bring its analysands (clients) out of a “bad” state and into 
a good one. Naturally, these concepts, of “bad” and “good” are rife with presumptions, 
hopes, failures, and fantasies. The important factor is that clients, whether clients of 
therapy of a psychological or medical nature, have acknowledged that something has 
gone wrong, something is “in a bad way”. One does not seek treatment because 
everything is good. Through therapy, a resolution the client seeks a resolution to this 
trouble, and this resolution has as a guide, some notion of health, whether correct or 
incorrect. The analyst, the therapist, is able find agency to cure precisely to the degree 





remember, however, that psychological health is not to be expected of analysts and 
psychologists any more than physical health is to be expected of physicians. All 
therapies tend towards the good (the ethical) without being themselves good. Therapy 
orients itself towards the good (as health), but there is no guarantee that such a good 
can be secured. Doctors still get sick, and Psychoanalysts still lose their sanity. It is this 
fact which reveals the deeply flawed nature of therapies.  
The qualitative nature of the mind makes it more difficult to identify and treat than 
the body. Any psychological theory then must resort to unusual measures to get at its 
subject. This is especially the case with Psychoanalysis. The unconscious, by its very 
nature, seems always to disappear into obscurity or distortion when approached 
directly. To bring it into consciousness involves a lengthy and painstaking translation 
process. The first step is to catch it. Hence, Psychoanalytic inquiry must typically 
approach its subject matter from an unexpected angle, to surprise unconscious 
processes during their routine activities, and take note of their patterns. Such strategies 
are necessary for any study or treatment of the common neuroses. Work in the area of 
psychosis calls for a different approach to the unconscious, which is readily apparent on 
the level of consciousness, which has collapsed to a singular egoic plane. 
Psychoanalytic practice thus operates in a topsy-turvy twilight zone, in which neither 
traditional ethics nor meaning-structures can readily find direct application, and in which 
the most primal of desires may find cathartic (i.e. purgative) expression. Psychoanalytic 
catharsis would give the impression, in this case, of providing an escape from ethics. It 





conclusion, however, in its haste, looks for ethics in the wrong way, and finding none, 
concludes that there is none available to find.  
The limitation of freedom through conformity to prescriptions provided by a 
master (or master code) has little to do with the relation of Psychoanalysis to the ethical. 
It should be clear that the analyst does not function as a kind of master in relation to the 
analysand (client). Neither does it promote an unproblematic model of freedom that 
would easily hypostatize into un-freedom. Such would suspend the possibility of ethics 
occurring at all. There can be no ethical model, no formula capable of offering 
homogenous responses to “trolley problem” style ethical questions which proliferate in 
contemporary ethical discourse, and which presuppose subjects stripped of the agency 
to make ethical decisions. If ethics is openly discussed by a Analyst, it can only be in a 
highly tentative tone. One can only hope that the Analyst has a clear idea of what is 
good. Just the same as any other therapeutic practice, confounding factors almost 
always make an entrance at some point. These confounding factors cannot be 
eliminated, but they can be thrown off balance, to prevent them from taking on an 
authoritarian character which would suspend agency. 
The relation between freedom and ethics is always aporetic, as opposed to 
negative or positive. We cannot say that ethics suspends freedom, but neither can we 
say that it enforces it. As Emmanuel Levinas pointed out, ethics begin where “freedom, 
instead of justifying itself, feels itself to be arbitrary and violent” (TI, p. 84). In the 
Psychoanalytic situation, there must first be an acknowledged freedom (in the form of 
free association, a necessity for Psychoanalytic practice), and secondly, there must be 





responsible. This Other is not found within analysis, but beyond it. If there is indeed 
such a thing as Psychoanalytic ethics, it is not in posited norms, but in its promotion of 
self-transcendence, in the sense that transcendence is never self-contained, but always 
points beyond itself without positing the essence of this beyondness. Transcendence is 
always transcendence towards an ideal never fully disclosed, but only approached as a 
limit, much as in the incremental manner of a calculus. 
In order to discover the ethical dimension of Psychoanalysis, however, we must 
first learn to remove the veneer of that which falsely presents itself as ethics. Although 
Psychoanalytic literature typically pays more attention to the unconscious as a 
transgressive force, acting from below, there are at least as many unconscious 
elements that function normatively, acting “from above”. Freud tells us “not only what is 
lowest, but also what is highest in the ego can be unconscious” (GS, p. 217). The 
“highest” portion of the ego (or that portion which approaches the superego) can easily 
end up goading the “lowest” portion into taking action, and thus providing more 
opportunities for future goading dynamics. This dynamic is easy to misinterpret as 
ethics, while it is in reality little more than another twist in the libidinal organization of its 
practitioner, allowing for the enjoyment of objects only in a closed system that posits 
objects as simultaneously condemned as immoral and promoted as tantalizingly 
transgressive. These “ethics”, bound by rules or a ruler, displace the agency of the actor 
to the rules s/he follows, which determine the actor‟s acts. This pathological dynamic 
may be distinguished from ethics proper which function not to promote tantalizingly 





unconscious desire from undue reliance4 on cathected (i.e. predetermined) objects, 
thereby allowing the subject to freely acknowledge its relation to the Other, or 
exteriority. There is, however, a horde of factors that serve to prevent ethical relation 
from occurring, the chief being confusion between cathected objects and exteriority. 
Cathexis is the process through which “psychical energy is attached to an idea or 
group of ideas, to a part of the body, to an object, etc.” (Laplanche & Pontalis, p. 62). 
Through cathexis, the world of consciousness becomes invested with meaning and 
desire. Without cathexis, desire would be free-floating, unattached to objects. It would 
operate chaotically, without rhyme or reason. The cathectic process is a normal part of 
the formation of an operative libidinal organization (in that it provides a structure for 
desire to follow), but should not be mistaken for ethical practice, or the externalization of 
desire. Only when released from an unmitigated focus on its own cathected structures, 
does the relation of the self to the Other become explicit. But for any relation to occur at 
all, there must first be a cathartic “purging” of any unnecessary cathectic dross, which 
provides not true relations but imaginary ones, and leads to painfully nonsensical 
ritualistic behavior and pathology. This behavior is characteristic of neurosis, and can 
clearly be observed in Freud‟s “Rat Man” case history, as when the Rat Man becomes 
fixated on cathected processes such as moving items off the road as well as with 
providing the correct payment for a pair of replacement glasses to the correct party.  
 As Freud notes in his case study of the “Rat Man”, the Rat Man‟s neurosis 
causes him to be:  
                                                          
4
 The definition of “undue reliance on cathexis” is a matter of interpretation by the analyst or ethicist in 
conjunction with the subject of the analysis or inquiry. It is my observation that “undue reliance on cathexis” 





[…] at once superstitious and not superstitious, there was a clear distinction 
between his attitude and the superstition of uneducated people who feel 
themselves at one with their belief. He seemed to understand that his 
superstition was dependent upon his obsessional thinking, although at times he 
gave way to it completely (TCH, p. 65). 
Although the Rat Man has surpassed a stage of primordial dependency on and 
reduction of the other (at which the ego is generated, and regression to which produces 
psychosis), he remains fixated at this stage, bound to refer back to it, and is often 
unable to think outside his ego without reference to superstitious apparatuses. These 
apparatuses are antithetical to true relationality, in that their original purpose was to 
reduce stimulation by reifying it.  
 Relationality can involve objects, but does not fixate upon them, as fixation 
always implies a leveling, a desire to reduce an object from its exteriority, to force it 
prematurely into immanence. The relational object must remain transcendental. Non-
transcendental, or immanent experience can only involve actors seamlessly involved in 
their milieu and which flow together and apart without boundaries. Relationality must 
simultaneously involve boundaries as well as their transcendence, whereas immanence 
collapses both boundaries and transcendence. 
Only once relationality has become explicit, and not subordinated to imaginary 
interests, can ethics become a possibility. Thus, catharsis leads, through its purgation of 
the imagination, in the direction of a true ethics, which are impossible insofar as they 
restrict the freedom of either the self or the other. This cathartic relation to ethics has 





defines ethics as either a normative prescription of transcendental objects to be desired 
and avoided or a purely theoretical description of ethical action which makes the entirety 
of ethics into an immanent system, incapable of dealing with exteriority without reducing 
it. The former definition of ethics provides guidelines for action, but suspends the 
freedom of the actor, whereas the latter delineates and categorizes the kinds of ethical 
action from which one can choose, posing ethics as a limited number of possibilities 
(e.g., the trolley problems and other similarly contrived thought experiments that run 
rampant throughout the ethical literature). 
Philosophically, I do not seek to destroy traditional notions of ethics in this thesis, 
but rather to highlight this cathartic dimension, which would allow for their meaningful 
activity, by bringing ethical discussion out of fixation on paradoxical and 
decontextualized problems. I am not interested in delineating a new ethical system to 
compete with or replace the old ones, but instead of offering a standpoint through which 
we may deepen our appreciation for and understanding of ethical theories and prepare 
to put them meaningfully into practice. The practice of Psychoanalysis offers us a 
unique perspective on the theory and practice of ethics in that it is not the role of 
Psychoanalysis to teach its Analysands (i.e. clients/patients) ethics, while at the same 
time retaining its ethicality. Though its employment of the cathartic method, it provides 
its Analysands with the agency and ability to choose to be ethical (or not), instead of 
being compelled helplessly in this way or that, compulsively carrying out ill-understood 
actions. It is this process of bringing the Analysand to the point wherein s/he may 
choose to live ethically that, in and of itself, constitutes the cathartic dimension of ethics 





In spite of its cynical appearance, Psychoanalysis does not toss ethics aside in 
favor a sensual hedonism or tyranny of physical pleasure. Anyone who steps out in the 
world, or studies pathology and/or criminality can easily observe the tyranny of 
hedonism. Psychoanalysis merely describes this in detail. Ethics involves not wallowing 
or basking in their enjoyment, but becoming able to see beyond them. We will only learn 
to see beyond a thing if we first understand it. Understanding, even of the pathological, 
can lead towards health, which is undeniably a good. Jacques Lacan, as an orthodox 
Freudian Psychoanalyst, told us directly that ethics is of central importance to 
understanding the root concerns of Psychoanalysis:  
Given all that is implied in this phrase, the ethics of Psychoanalysis will allow me 
[…] to give you the most suitable instruments for understanding what is new both 
in Freud‟s work and in the experience of Psychoanalysis that derives from it.” 
(EP, p. 1).  
Our understanding of the ethical dimension inherent to Psychoanalytic method will allow 
us to understand the function of Psychoanalysis in a broader context. Analysis, as a 
particular discipline, does not teach ethics (as this would be the role of philosophers, 
clergy, and/or sages), yet everything in it points toward a purification of ethical practice 
by focusing in on those elements which are most easily neglected, or instrumentalized 
in the name of some higher good. The statements we find littered throughout Freud‟s 
writings on the baseness of human life, inevitability of violence, barbaric sexuality, &c, I 
understand to serve primarily as an acknowledgment of the overwhelming excess of 
human failure and misery, while implicitly highlighting the miracle of the good, whenever 





tragedy, and this was the original context in which Aristotle discussed it. The pity excited 
by tragedy exposes one‟s own fears. As Bernays wrote, the spectator of the tragedy 
“beholds himself in the mirror of a being who is similar in kind to himself, and the pity 
that he feels for the represented sorrow can throw back the reflex of fear into his own 
inwardness” (p. 340). Tragedy thus has potential to expose latent pathology by 
exposing the fears and insecurities that drive it, allowing it to be more easily treated. In 
the same way that a body‟s convalescent response is the most painful aspect of injury 
or sickness, tragedy can lead to psychological convalescence, if it is not indulged in for 
its own sake (a tendency which, if not kept in check, can easily run rampant and lead to 
its own pathologies). The horrors of Psychoanalytic theory offer us a unique opportunity 
to confront the tragedies which are part and parcel of human existence. There is no 
known human being, at any time in the past or present, regardless of their social status 
or character, who has gone through life without sickness, tragedy, or death. Tragedy 
would seem then to be inevitable. Nevertheless, it need not evolve into cynicism or 
melancholy. Through the often-disturbing theories found in the Freudian corpus, we can 
move towards something that may encompass this tragic nature of reality. 
This does not mean, however, that there is a Psychoanalytic “prescription” to 
give in ethical matters. The cathartic abreaction allows for the possibility of ethics, which 
are impossible to practice in all but the most favorable circumstances, without forcing 
their implementation or formalization. Of course, this is easier to describe than to 
practice. True ideological neutrality is difficult, if not impossible to achieve. As 
Laplanche & Pontalis note, “[…] neutrality, is, obviously, an ideal to be aimed at rather 





however, that catharsis (or purgation) of excessive cathectic elements can occur, 
allowing for the possibility of the Analysand reaching the position of being confronted 
with the ethical relation. The Analyst can only treat Analysands to the degree that s/he 
has completed her/his analysis.  
In the section titled “The Problem of a Psychoanalytic Ethics”, I will address the 
cathartic dimension of ethics in Psychoanalysis by firstly dispelling the notion of 
Psychoanalysis as a either a destruction of ethics or an ethical “education”, by 
surveying Freud‟s thoughts on these matters. In the section titled “Formation of the 
Ego”, I will lay out the developmental processes that occur during the formation of the 
ego, leading to the ego‟s fantasized relations, which prevent ethics from occurring by 
focusing on the work of Jacques Lacan and Melanie Klein. Finally, in the section titled 
“The Cathartic Dimension of Ethics in Psychoanalysis”, I will summarize my main points 
and try to wrap the paper up neatly. Theoretically, I attempt to build mainly from the 
work of Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan, though I include some others as well. My 
definition of “ethics”, I have inherited largely from Emmanuel Levinas, insofar as I define 
this as a primordial relation of responsibility to the Other, experienced only as 
exteriority. Psychoanalysis is not to be this relation (and neither can any practice), but 
ideally lays the groundwork for it, by cathartically working-through the systematic 








THE PROBLEM OF A PSYCHOANALYTIC ETHICS, FREUD‟S AVOIDANCE OF 
IDEALISM 
 Finding the place of ethics in Psychoanalysis, is difficult, as we‟ve seen. It is 
equally difficult to find them in any philosophy of mind. We may schematize this difficulty 
as a tension between two poles. Firstly, we can, following the cynical path which half-
interested observers never fail to mistakenly discern in Freud‟s work, reduce ethics to a 
naturalistic function or drive by explaining them entirely in terms of the promotion of life 
and death in a biological organism (i.e., interpret ethics only as merely an expression of 
drives for life/libido or death/thanatos). Secondly, we can attempt to sidestep Freud‟s 
descriptions of the pitfalls of moralism, and interpret ethics as a purely prescriptive duty, 
which, if followed renders us “good”, and if violated renders us “guilty”. The former 
interpretation over-particularizes ethics, restricting its concerns to those concrete 
variables affecting a particular organism only in relation to the concerns of its biological 
function, causing ethics as a whole to approach atomistic imperceptibility, whereas the 
latter over-generalizes it, making the application of ethics to particular situations 
inapplicable to any concrete situation.  
To the degree that one of these methods (of over-particularization or over-
generalization) is favored over the other, an ethicist becomes a spokesperson for the 
biological drives against the conscience, or the conscience against the biological drives. 
The tension between these two poles is what makes ethics into a hypostatized system, 
which makes no allowance for exteriority. Relation to the Other (or others) is not a 
completely structured, systematic discourse, as structure itself always implies a deferral 





for any ethical activity. Instead of attempting to mediate between these two poles or 
synthesize them, I will, in what follows, attempt to show the place for an ethics of the 
Other in Psychoanalysis, which is implied in the process of catharsis. Jacques Lacan 
has laid the groundwork for this inquiry, as he has gone at least as far as any other 
Psychoanalytic theorist (or philosopher) in taking Freudian theory to its furthest reaches 
and beyond, while maintaining the centrality of ethical relation. So then, what I write has 
origins in Freud‟s Psychoanalytic theory, but I am attempting to pick up a kernel of it, 
deposited at the threshold of Psychoanalytic theory by Jacques Lacan, and take this 
even further into the murky but fertile grounds of philosophical inquiry that surrounds 
every discipline in its particularity. 
 If ethics is a problematic and highly disputed area of Philosophy, this is even 
more the case in Psychoanalysis. Sigmund Freud described his view of ethics in 
Civilization and Its Discontents as  
[…] an endeavor to achieve, by means of a command of the super-ego5, 
something which has so far not been achieved by means of any other cultural 
activities. As we already know, the problem before us is how to get rid of the 
greatest hindrance to civilization-namely, the constitutional inclination of human 
beings to be aggressive towards one another; and for that very reason we are 
especially interested in what is probably the most recent of the cultural 
commands of the superego, the commandment to love one‟s neighbor as 
oneself.” (p. 108). 
                                                          
5
 Freud usually uses the term “superego” to refer to the reactive, authoritarian aspects of the conscience. These 





This frames ethics as either hopeless, insofar as human aggressivity is unavoidable or 
undesirable, insofar as it would only be achieved only through the meta-aggressions6 of 
the super-ego. Indeed, morality itself, throughout the whole of Freud‟s work, is 
understood to be highly problematic, and very often pathological. This, however, does 
not indicate that Psychoanalytic theory is amoral, but that it is concerned with mapping 
the subtle twists of desire, which can easily pollute even the most outwardly moral 
actions. Ethics has often served as little more than a safe haven for many of the most 
aggressive and chaotic impulses in human nature.  
Perhaps one of Sigmund Freud‟s most enduring insights is that moralistic 
behavior often functions as a cover for impulses one has learned to disown as 
“immoral”. Our everyday desires have the capacity to produce within us a tremendous 
conflict. This can lead us to construct rigid moral laws (enforced by what Freud referred 
to as the “superego”) to prevent these deviant desires from finding expression 
detectable by others who will recognize it as abnormal. This process of disavowal of the 
drives leads to the construction of the superego that presides over the conscious mind 
as a moral authority. It is impossible to ignore, however, that many of the cruelest 
historical events have occurred under the guise of law. As Jacques Lacan wrote, 
“Whoever attempts to submit to the moral law sees the demands of his superego grow 
increasingly meticulous and cruel” (EP, p. 176). This cruelty is, in and of itself, a warped 
expression for the impulses, which the superego dams up in the form of guilt. This 
shows us that morality is a topic independent of the relation of authority to rebellion, 
                                                          
6
 By this term, I attempt to designate Freud’s concern that any removal of aggression will only occur through its 






both of which can be either moral or immoral. Authority is no more inherently moral than 
rebellion against it is. 
 Neither can we equate guilt and innocence with morality. An overwhelming sense 
of guilt can impel aggressive behavior at least as easily as an unshakeable sense of 
innocence. Although we hear about immoral acts carried out in the name of some 
purportedly innocent cause on a regular basis, this is far from being a universal 
phenomenon. Many “wrongdoers” are capable of admitting that they know that what 
they are doing is wrong, but that for one reason or another, they merely find their 
impulses irresistible. The impulse to do things one knows is wrong can often find 
strength in the sense that it is somehow transgressive, as Freud describes in the 
following quote from The Ego and the Id: 
It was a surprise to find that an increase in [an] unconscious sense of guilt can 
turn people into criminals. But it is undoubtedly a fact. In many criminals, 
especially youthful ones, it is possible to detect a very powerful sense of guilt, 
which existed before the crime, and is therefore not its result but its motive. It is 
as if it was a relief to be able to fasten this unconscious sense of guilt onto 
something real and immediate (EI, p. 42). 
If the feeling that one‟s impulse(s) have transgressed a moral law were an effective way 
to prevent their active expression, one would think that guilty feelings, as an 
acknowledgment of crossing a boundary, would act as a deterrent against carrying them 
out. In many cases, however, we can see that guilt does precisely the opposite, and 
produces a more robust buildup of tension to be resolved only through actualization. 





actualization even more persistently in the future. This is what we may refer to as the 
feedback loop of guilt, which oscillates between authoritarian morality and rebellious 
immorality. 
  We may also trace desires back to their biological roots, and attempt to minimize 
their repression by giving these supposed roots free rein to act as they please. By 
accounting for desires naturalistically, normative, duty-based ethics begin to look more 
and more like a system of repression aimed at inherent tendencies, which produce 
tension through their very existence and will find relief through outward expression in 
one way or another. This interpretation of ethics, taken to its limit leads to their reduction 
under the heading of fully isolated and particularized biological impulses, which, insofar 
as they are “natural”, must find recognition as what they truly are without the 
superimposition of moralistic/ethical desires on top of them. 
 Following from this interpretation of ethical desire, ethical tension is a result of 
the authoritarian nature of ethics itself, which denies the more primal impulses of a living 
being. Pathology thus finds its origins in a primordial denial of natural inclinations that 
are undeniable insofar as one participates in nature. Nature thus takes on the form of a 
completed totality. The resolution of pathologies is then simple: liberate these natural 
inclinations, let them flow freely. However, as in the literature of naturalistic liberation 
(i.e. in the literature of libertines such as the Marquis de Sade), we do not find not a 
natural agency liberated from oppressive morality. Instead, in libertinism, we find  “[…] a 
note of defiance, a kind of trial by ordeal in relation to that which remains the terminal 
point of this argument, an undoubtedly diminished but nevertheless fixed term” (EP, 





also upon a rebellion against what is perceived to fall outside of it, thereby remaining 
dependent upon it. It is more of a reaction to a perceived tendency towards ascetic 
martyrdom, as Leupin points out in the work of Jacques Lacan, which “stresses the 
complete failure of all experiences of sexual liberation, which have missed the renewal 
of guilt inevitably associated with the emphasis on pleasure” (p. 65). This is not only the 
case with sexual hedonism, but applies to all forms of naturalistic hedonism so well 
typified in libertinism. Affirmation of nature, even as a totality leads even more to the 
denial of what is seen as un-natural. Pleasure, insofar as it operates through rebellion, 
confines itself to guilt, even in the act of disavowing it. Transgression of the moral order 
takes on its meaning only in relation to the fixed term of the very order it escapes, or 
else attempts to escape from. This means that, as something created, the moral order 
only takes on meaning through continual creation. If it did not matter, there would be no 
point in rebelling against it. This is part of the paradoxical insight that those who rebel 
against an institution are often more convinced of its reality than the institution‟s own 
members are. 
 It is true; however, that Psychoanalysis is easy to interpret as a theory of the 
reduction of ethics through the naturalistic liberation of desire. If we define ethics as an 
unleashing of biological desires for pleasure, Freud would seem to be in agreement with 
us. He saw true pleasure as orgasmic, in the biological sense. He described intellectual 
pleasure as “mild compared with that derived from the sating of crude and primary 
instinctual impulses, [as] it does not convulse our physical being.” (CD, p. 30). Crude 
and primary instinct is the phrase we ought to hold on to in this passage. For Freud, 





reflection. Physiological processes “happen” before we have any structured framework 
to “hang” them on. Similarly, the often-crude subject matter of Freud‟s writings, full of 
sexual and violent themes, is less of a model for the practice of psychoanalysis (Freud 
did not go out hunting for sexuality and violence, he merely listened for trends in the 
complaints of his patients) than a lesson. These “crude” aspects of the mind are easy to 
ignore, whether through prudishness, or through the methods of repression and 
disavowal. Freud‟s work is as a testament to the ongoing importance of these issues, 
and their role in the formation of pathologies. Psychoanalysis does not aim at reducing 
the rest of life to desires for sexuality and violence (the life and death drives 
respectively), but at delineating the ways in which we may easily become caught in the 
throes of them. It shows us the manifold ways in which all meaning can be reduced to a 
function, which exerts a tyrannical control over us, preventing us from freely 
participating in the world of meaning. 
Psychoanalytic theory differs from other psychological theories in that it does not 
directly disclose the truth, nor does it provide a truth to believe or reject, but rather 
seeks to find truth‟s location, in places overinvested with meaning. If Psychoanalysis 
seems confronts the most strange and uncomfortable issues, this is precisely because it 
is these issues which tend to be the most oversaturated with meaning. The anxiety 
surrounding issues of “base drives” is precisely what is most telling about them. In his 
seminar on The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, Jacques Lacan tells us 
that “for analysis, anxiety is a crucial form of reference, because in effect anxiety is that 
which does not deceive. But anxiety may be lacking.” (p. 41). This is especially true in 





common form of entertainment. It is easy to remain as a sleepwalking observer, 
following along with things that would be incredibly anxiety provoking were they to take 
on personal implications. On a literal level, when one wakes up from a dream during 
sleep, it is the result of anxiety as Freud notes: 
Anxiety dreams are mostly those whose material has undergone the least 
distortion. If the demand made by the unconscious is too great, so that the 
sleeping ego is not in a position to ward it off by the means at its disposal, it 
abandons the wish to sleep and returns to waking life.” (OP, p. 56). 
Like these anxiety-dreams, the work of Psychoanalysis is to show us the truth, wherever 
it may be, without imposing a prepackaged meaning on our lives, or to suggest a path 
down which we ought to walk. This anxiety brought on by Psychoanalytic theory is 
nothing other than the anxiety of finally awakening from a slumber.  
 Although Freud‟s work is often disturbing in terms of its contents, I understand 
this not as directly indicative of its metaphysical structure but as a method to jolt us 
awake from the numbed-out apathy (or jadedness) towards life which constitutes the 
surface layer of the long-term neurosis. His disturbing images of the animalistic, violent, 
and incestuous human being are not models, but lessons. The first lesson in 
psychoanalysis then, is that meaning isn‟t easy to maintain, and that truth is difficult to 
face. Desire‟s trajectories are not for the faint of heart, as Lacan says, “what is called 
desire suffices to make life meaningless if it turns someone into a coward” (EC, p. 660). 
Just when one thinks one has been freely saying exactly what one wanted, there turns 
out to be not only a structure, but an order to one‟s words. It is the pursuit of this order 





psychoanalytic prescription as to how one is to behave, no moralizing suggestion as to 
what one should enhance or remove in one‟s life, one is encouraged, first of all, to look 
directly at it, owning up to any anxiety that arises.  
  The operation of ethics in Psychoanalysis, then, lies not in its revelation of 
naturalistic functions of desire, nor in its discoveries regarding the function of guilt. 
There is no prescription either to carry out one‟s moral duties, or to give free rein to a 
subset of one‟s desires. Instead, the interrelation between transgressive desires and the 
guilt that represses them finds exposure through the discovery of truth beyond illusion. 
Only after this has occurred, will we be able to distinguish between what is truly ethical 
and what merely appears as such. Both sociality (in the forms of guilt and shame) as 
well as biology (in the form of naturalistic drives) as hypostatized in the form of ego-
images obscure our situation and thereby undermine our freedom to make ethical 
decisions in reality. If we are to move beyond their unmitigated influence, we must find a 
way to give them freedom of expression, without giving one authority over the other. In 
order to do this, we must look to the ego, as the locus of the conflict between 











THE FORMATION OF THE EGO, A SYNTHESIS OF LACAN AND KLEIN‟S 
DISCUSSIONS OF THE EGO WITH MY OWN OBSERVATIONS 
 If we were to ask a phenomenologist what it is that makes us free, the reply 
would certainly be that if there is any freedom to be had, it would be in the ego (which, 
understood as the most basic unit of consciousness, is merely another term for it). It is a 
pity then, that the free ego always seems to turn out to be subject(ed) to something 
else, whether its own desires, to public discourse, to neurology, or other static variables. 
In spite of its freedom, consciousness, as Levinas writes in Otherwise than Being, “is 
affected, then, before forming an image of what is coming to it, affected in spite of itself” 
(OB, p. 102). Before we are able to produce an image of what affects our awareness, 
whether neurological, social, or political, &c, we are affected on a more primordial level. 
At early stages of physical development, affectedness is particularly difficult to 
understand, due to its intensity and unpredictability. This results in the formation of 
egoic objects through a process of cathexis. The undeveloped ego deduces from its 
vulnerability the presence of unpredictable and often threatening forces outside of itself. 
These forces eventually solidify into objects through the process of cathexis, which 
makes the environment seem more predictable at the cost of free relation to it. Reality 
takes on a spectral quality, populated largely by self-referential, cathectic affectivity7. 
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 Even highly complex and nuanced discourses can take on this character (of spectral self-reference), insofar as 
they purport to either reduce all possibility to actuality or provide the method to do so, requiring no reference to 
exteriority. It is important not to generalize our fear of interiority, however. It would be easy to accuse GWF Hegel, 
for example, of promoting a system of totalizing enclosure, but the often-neglected higher levels of his dialectic 
deal primarily in the realm of possibility. Paradoxically, fear of totalization can easily encourage the complete 





These cathexes, however, must be purged cathartically if true relation is to be 
recognized8.  
This interaction of the ego with what it is not (i.e. the Other) can lead to different 
conclusions regarding its freedom. Often, when things are going smoothly, 
consciousness seems free from superimposed structures, free to define itself however it 
pleases, unobstructed by its affectedness. This state, however, is impossible to 
maintain. Obstacles arise all too easily, if not in the form of our own miscalculations 
regarding exterior events which subsequently illuminates the contingency of whatever 
agency we experience, then in the form of raw, unvarnished misfortune. There may 
indeed be such a thing as freedom, but if there is, it would seem to be a very delicate 
state, difficult to acquire, and easy to fall out of. Once it‟s fallen out of, not only is the 
contingency of our egoic agency revealed, but we often tighten the knot of dependency 
ourselves by imagining all kinds of novel dependencies. As Freud reminds us:  
As long as things go well with a man, his conscience is lenient and lets the ego 
do all sorts of things; but when misfortune befalls him, he searches his soul, 
acknowledges his sinfulness, heightens the demands of his conscience, imposes 
abstinences on himself and punishes himself with penances (CD, p. 87).  
The ego may have some notion of freedom, but is ultimately bound to circumstances 
over which it has no control. This is a result of the fact that the ego itself is not an 
original presence but is itself as much of an illusion as the objects it uses to stabilize its 
world, and is generated through a specific process, tied up with specific worldly 
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 This is where I differ from both Freud and Lacan, upon whose thought I have developed my own views. I assert all 
cathexes to be egoic, and that what Freud referred to as the “superego” is merely a reaction to instinctual 
functioning. I do not prioritize the ego metaphysically, but I do prioritize it as the universal locus of pathological 
structuration. The goal of analysis is to move beyond purely egoic relations, which are by nature pseudo-relations, 





conditions. This conditionality of the ego‟s genesis creates a profound schism with itself. 
It experiences its essence as freedom, yet its origin is contingent. Thus, the ego is, at its 
core, an illusion. It is surrounded by contingencies falsely understood as freedom and 
freedoms falsely understood as contingency. 
The illusion of the ego is provided through the medium of reflection. In his early 
essay on the mirror stage, Lacan describes the ego‟s genesis as a moment of truly 
narcissistic reflection (EC, p. 79). The ego arises out of a process in which an image 
returns to itself, producing an identity or selfsameness. The ego is thus spectral or 
illusory; it does not exist outside of the reflective medium. It is identity in the logical 
sense of “a=a”, in which the “a” on the left is distinguished from the “a” on the right. At 
early stages of life, this kind of experience may only occur in front of surfaces which are 
reflective in a literal sense. Later, one may come to learn to see “reflections” 
everywhere.  
The atom reflects the cosmos, the self reflects the other, the child becomes the 
parent, and the student becomes the teacher. “You” often becomes little more than a 
reflected reversal of “I”. Although this may be comforting insofar as it allows for the 
creation of a stable identity, it is also creates the armor of alienation (EC, p. 78). One 
may see reflections of oneself in other people, animals or even inanimate objects, yet 
discover an inability to relate to any of them. We may, like G.W. Leibniz, desire to think 
like an atom, while losing the ability to understand the relations that occur in our own 
lives. After all, anyone can imagine an atom, but it is impossible to imagine the other. 
The unbinding of the ego‟s reflectivity is also the unbinding of reflective distortion. It is 





function of egoic consciousness is essentially identification and nothing else. The self 
wants to see itself in the other and reflect the other in itself. This process leads every 
experience to solipsistically reflect back to the ego. Unbounded reflectivity allows 
consciousness to imagine that it is everywhere. As Sass observes: “The mirror 
experience, whether real or imagined, can be read as the ultimate fantasy of solipsistic 
self-sufficiency- one that transcends solipsism‟s lived contradictions” (pgs. 129-130). 
Mirroring allows one to think that even though one may remain dependent upon others 
in many respects both psychological and physical, these others are in some way 
identical with the self. 
There is, then, in the genesis of the ego, a simultaneous dissolution of the self 
into the other and the other into the self. In his famous “Memoirs of My Nervous Illness”, 
Daniel Paul Schreber first describes the inessentiality of every individual soul, or self: 
It was granted to no human soul to remain aware for all eternity of having been 
this or that human being. It was rather the destiny of all souls to merge with other 
souls, and to integrate with higher entities, remaining only aware of being part of 
God (p. 52). 
Nonetheless, in spite of all of the intertwining of selves, reflection ensures that the final 
image will be given narcissistically. After all, if the self were truly to absorb otherness, 
the result would be omnipresence and omnipotence, in brief, godhood. Although he 
speaks of the dissolution of individual self, Schreber finds his personal individuality 
swollen to unprecedented proportions, claiming that  
[…] everything that happens is in reference to me. Writing this sentence, I am 





conceited; I know very well that this tendency to relate everything to oneself, to 
bring everything that happens into connection with one‟s own person, is a 
common phenomenon among mental patients. But in my case the very reverse 
obtains. 
At the genesis of the ego, regressed to in psychosis, notably as it is recounted in 
Schreber‟s memoir, boundaries between self and other are both nonexistent and 
omnipresent. Schreber himself is fully aware that what he is describing is a common 
symptom of psychosis (thoughts of reference), yet he cannot shake the feeling that this 
experience is his in particular. His experience is irreducible to that of others, and others 
to himself. At the same time, he acknowledges the inevitability of merging on a 
metaphysical level with others. Reflectivity, when universalized, becomes little more 
than an exercise in futility. No reflective medium can ever perfectly reflect the original 
content, and the more mediums involved, the more damage is done to the original 
message. The universe becomes a house of mirrors with no escape. The ego‟s genesis 
in reflection thus points to an obfuscation of communication, an inability to allow for 
relationality, which requires both individuals and their transcendence without dissolution.  
This reflection is an empty exercise because the ego is itself devoid of content. 
Because it is by nature this very reflective process, it does not take on substance or 
depth. As much as we repeat the “a=a” identity, it is impossible to shake the sense that 
there is more than one “a” present. The larger the portion of reality that the ego takes 
up, the more reality takes on a spectral, illusory quality. This illusory quality implies a 
kind of neutrality, insofar as one is unaffected by experiences understood to be illusions. 





as it neutralizes it as much as possible” (EFT, p. 100). Just as a mirror with too many 
cracks becomes useless, any unpredictability or reminder of the outside world (whether 
misfortune or surprise) makes obvious the ego‟s illusory nature. 
Just as the mythical figure Narcissus peered ever more closely into the pond 
reflecting his image until he drowned, the reflective ego moves ever closer to the 
surfaces that reflect it, and will eventually discover its discrepancy with them, or else 
lose its self in them. This discovery of discrepancy exposes the imaginary nature of the 
ego, and thereby is not only experienced as an act of aggression, but also provokes it to 
re-disguise itself. As Lacan notes, the ego aggression9 is “[…] linked to the narcissistic 
relationship and to the structures of systematic misrecognition and objectification that 
characterize ego formation” (EC, p. 94). The genesis of the ego occurs when one first 
identifies one‟s own reflection (this “a=a” identification), and begins to refer the world to 
oneself, however, in spite of reflectivity‟s de-intensification of primary (instinctual) 
processes, needs, and desires, danger and chaos remain present. As Sass writes, “[...] 
even the achievement of absolute epistemological centrality cannot bring total serenity” 
(p. 123). Un-bounding the process of identification and making everything into a 
reflection of one‟s self can only occur after the process of identification has taken place, 
and as such can do nothing to interfere with the identification process of which it is a 
mere epiphenomenon. 
Although the ego subsists only as a reflective image, it is surrounded by other 
images as well, which are either swept up in its self-identification process (as objects), 
or else are disavowed (disowned), subsequently becoming adversaries in the ego‟s 
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 The ego, as both imaginary and secondary, is not the source of this aggression. Rather, ego aggression has its 





“struggle” against what it is not, and drowns it in its own image. As Lacan wrote, “the 
ego appears, for its part, in the world of objects, as an object, though a privileged one to 
be sure” (EFT, p. 177). The important thing to note is that these objects, while distinct 
from the ego, are not outside of the ego in any meaningful sense. In the same manner 
in which the solipsist believes that everything in the world is a product of his or her 
imagination, the ego‟s objects are nothing but (often distorted) surfaces upon which it 
projects itself. A reflection implies two images: one an original, and the other a copy. 
The genesis of the ego involves not only limitless projection outwards (aggression in 
pathological states), but limitless receptivity inwards (paranoia in pathological states). 
This dynamic is what, if left unvarnished, leads to psychosis, in which all boundaries 
between self and other are collapsed. It is typified in Daniel Paul Schreber‟s “Memoirs of 
My Nervous Illnes”, in which he painstakingly describes not only extreme narcissistic 
agency (projection) but suspension of all freedom (receptivity), becoming a mere puppet 
of an Other‟s will: “since my nervous illness took [a] critical turn, my nerves have been 
set in motion from without incessantly and without respite” (p. 47). The ego‟s generation 
produces a dialectic between aggression and paranoia. This can only be superseded 
through further developments which serve to contextualize the ego.  
 All that I discussed above served to highlight the ego as a fertile ground for 
pathology and for all manner of destructiveness to find expression through. 
Nevertheless, it is important to remember that although pathology makes its most 
obvious appearance in the egoic plane (or imaginary register), we may illustrate 
metaphorically the revelation of pathology in the ego as the appearance of the 





which pathological elements become legible, treatable, and comprehensible. In their 
original state, they were blind(ing) impulses, which the growing child could not handle. 
The ego thus serves a purpose other than the mere distortion of relations through 
reflective illusion. It reduces the intensity which flows freely throughout the world, and 
which one comes into contact with as time progresses. As Laplanche writes, it is “the 
agency whose function is precisely to moderate the frenetic circulation of affect in which 
the primary process consists […]” (p. 39). It arises in early childhood to allow for the 
management of disruptive impulses, which affect the child from without. This leads to an 
oversimplification of the world, experienced only as imaginary, but it also leads to an 
ability to grapple with the world without the blind impulse of mechanical force. This early 
stage, in which the ego presides unilaterally over a world of image-object receptacles, is 
structurally analogous to psychosis, in which the universe becomes a grand unified 
mirror. In both cases, the line between reality and imagination is blurred, or absent. This 
ambiguity between imagination and reality gives rise to fear and paranoia. When the 
ego is undisturbed in its rule over life, it experiences any weakness in the potency of its 
fantasy as the product of outside aggression.  
In at the point of the ego‟s genesis, Otherness functions as a threat to the 
solitude of the imaginary ego, plagued by constant anxiety about an invasion from the 
outside. Defenses are built up to counter the “persecutory” forces of the Other which the 
ego has been unable to integrate. As Klein wrote, “the characteristic defenses are 
chiefly aimed at annihilating the „persecutors‟, while anxiety on the ego‟s account 
occupies a prominent place in the picture” (p. 264). Inversely, paranoia and aggression 





Lacan stated in his seminar on The Other Side of Psychoanalysis that “All acts of 
bastardry are based on the fact of wishing to be someone‟s Other, I mean someone‟s 
big Other, in which the figures by which his desire will be captivated are drawn.” (p. 61). 
Paranoia while seemingly directed at objects, is always undergirded by an anxiety which 
is itself objectless, and which, as I noted earlier, is an indicator of close proximity to 
reality. As disturbing and dangerous as paranoid acts can be, consciousness receives 
its foundation in this state, insofar as it occurs at all. A child‟s fear of monsters lurking in 
hiding spots bears an uncanny resemblance to paranoid delusions of persecutors acting 
through elaborate means (as, for instance, in Schreber‟s description of God‟s 
manipulation of his nervous system). Psychosis is never an entirely novel development, 
but a regression to the ego‟s formation. Even the more common pathologies (neuroses) 
which have a subtler symptomatology do not involve an active regress to the formation 
of the ego, but an insufficient transcendence of it. As Freud notes in his study on 
Schreber, and his most thorough inquiry into the nature of psychosis, in the case of 
Psychotics, “[…] the patients themselves […] possess the peculiarity of betraying (in a 
distorted form, it is true) precisely those things which other neurotics keep hidden as a 
secret.” (TCH, p. 83). As Juan-David Nasio tells us, “we all have a seed of insanity that 
does not affect our stability; a localized madness we ignore” (p. 82). Although the ego is 
typically not the primary means of functioning in most healthy adults, it is always 
present, and insofar as it is present, so will be the fantasies which make it what it is. 
The ethical is completely out of the question in the register of the ego. Before 
anything else, ethics are always relational, and as such cannot occur in any state in 





identity-relation to itself. The ego, however, is not un-ethical, but pre-ethical. It does not 
operate (even in its aggression) as a testament to immorality, but to pre-morality. The 
ego clearly displays what it is that prevents ethics from occurring insofar as it arises out 
of an excessive instinctual frustration. The ego does not tell us where to find pathology, 
but instead shows us through its very existence.  
 In order to move beyond this primordial psychosis rooted in the ego, a catharsis 
must occur. Through catharsis, the psyche jettisons the cathectic residue that remains 
in the ego. This requires an ability to purge the images that repetitively define its activity. 
Moving beyond the ego means the discovery of transcendence in the Other, the 
noumena, the unthinkable. Instead of seeing the world as object-receptacle for it to fill in 
with its imaginative projections, or of itself as a receptacle for the world, a revelation 
occurs that the ego is inadequate to produce relationality, in that it follows a specific 
circuit defined by the primary process of which it is epiphenomenon. With this discovery, 
the pre-ethical nature of egoic life becomes explicit. Responsibility and guilt often arise, 
as Klein wrote, “the ego comes to a realization of its love for a good object, a whole 
object, and in addition a real object, together with an overwhelming feeling of guilt 
towards it” (p. 270). An object, as Klein refers to it, is not merely another reflective 
surface. We may question somewhat whether the term “object” is even appropriate for 
it, as an object is typically instrumentalizable. What Klein describes as the good, whole 
object is no longer thinkable as a mere image-receptacle for the projections of the ego, 
or as an interrogator with a direct line to the innermost recesses of the mind. The good, 
whole object, is necessarily exterior to the ego. It does not need the ego to take on its 





relations with objects (both actively and passively), which brings on (as cited in Klein 
above) feelings of profound guilt. This guilt is of a unique kind, however, in that it is 
simultaneously guilt for aggression, as well as guilt for paranoia, neither of which need 
to have had any relation to reality. Up to this point, the behavior of the ego is a-moral. It 
can be neither good nor bad, because no true relation is capable of occurring (other 
than reflection, which operates as a kind of deferral of relation).  
 Although the passive/active, solipsistic ego in its early stages seeks out a 
narcissistic pleasure in all of its object-reflections, the ego, after discovering the good, 
whole object (which is in fact the Other), ceases or at least tempers its delusional 
objectification process. This suspension or tempering of projective-objectification, I 
interpret as the essence of what Freud referred to as the latency period. This period of 
latency following the exclusive predominance of egoic function can also be interpreted 
as the stage of mourning, referred to by Klein as “the depressive position”.  In the 
depressive position, the ego is  
made to realize that the loved [good] object is at the same time the hated one 
(which through its persecution inspired paranoia); and in addition to this, that the 
real objects and imaginary figures, both external and internal, are bound up with 
each other” (Klein, p. 285-6).  
The grandiose yet volatile egoic relations of the past are transformed into responsibility 
to allow for a genuine relation to an object that is complete in itself and has no need for 
the intervention of the ego. Similarly, during the stage of latency described by Freud, 





detected. The point to be derived here is that with the ego‟s discovery of an irreducible 
exterior, its instrumental attitude withers.  
 Relation with the whole object (which can also be described as Otherness or 
Noumena), unencumbered by projection and other imaginary processes can only take 
place through the symbolic: “It is necessary for the symbolic system to intervene in the 
system conditioned by the image of the ego so that an exchange can take place, 
something which isn‟t knowledge, but recognition” (EFT, p. 52). Instead of knowing what 
it relates to, as in earlier stages, the ego recognizes its place in symbolic relation to the 
whole object, this first true Other. A symbol is merely something which is given, and 
which is subsequently interpreted. The ego, at this stage, can even discover itself as a 
symbol, as well as symbolizable, which previously would have been unthinkable due to 
its reflectiveness, as Lacan notes, “The ego isn‟t just a function. From the moment when 
the symbolic system is instituted, it can itself be used as a symbol, and that is what we 
are considering” (EFT, p. 52). If solipsism is incapable of one thing, it would be 
symbolization, which requires a clear distinction between self and other. In order for 
solipsism to be surpassed, the ego must overcome its status as mere reflector and 
reflected. It must become a symbol.   
 With the ego held in place by its symbolic position for the first time, it can, finally 
meaningfully engage in symbolic discourse, both producing symbols as well as 
interpreting them. Whereas during previous stages of development, the ego could only 
encounter partial objects capable of producing feelings of either paranoia or grandiosity, 
the ego can now differentiate between objects and the discourses in which they 





exchange with the Other. Only at this point is there a true relation, and thereby ethics is 
capable of taking place. Ethical language is dialogical10, a free relation, but with symbols 
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 I take this position contrary to the position of Jacques Lacan, for whom the dialogue is always on the cusp of 
breaking down. This may be true, but the fact remains that any subordination of dialogue to discourse prevents 
the free circulation of symbols, and thus returns us to a hierarchical system awaiting a rebellion, not a situation in 





THE CATHARTIC REFERENCE TO ETHICS IN PSYCHOANALYSIS 
 In a lucid moment, Sigmund Freud wrote, “it may be said of the id that it is totally 
non-moral, of the ego that it strives to be moral, and of the super-ego that it can be 
super-moral and then become as cruel as only the id can be” (EI, p. 44). Following from 
this, it would initially have made the greatest amount of sense for us to look for 
Psychoanalytic ethics in the place of the ego, if not in actuality then at least in 
potentiality. Upon closer inspection, however, we have discovered the ego to be the 
locus of a primordial illusion, thereby unable to relate to anything outside itself, except 
through its own narcissistic apparatuses. Only in working through the reflectivity of the 
ego can we discover the possibility of true relation, and therefore ethics. The goal of 
Psychoanalytic ethics is to bring about a paradigm shift: a decentralization of the ego. 
We produce this shift by the cathartic process of purging excessive imaginary object-
cathexes, which act as artificial barriers to true relationality, which by nature respects 
the integrity of all involved parties. Between the transgressions of the unconscious id 
and the transcendence of the superego‟s moral law, a space opens up in the place of 
the ego, through catharsis, in which immanent relation to the Other becomes possible: it 
is this which references ethics. It references ethics because it is not yet ethics itself. 
Catharsis leads to the possibility of ethics, a move beyond the pre-ethical, not their 
consummation, which cannot occur in the context of psychoanalysis. While therapy of 
every kind targets the pathological, it does not and cannot produce health, which occurs 
freely and of its own accord when pathological influences have subsided.  
 Psychoanalysis has been critical, historically (as in Sigmund Freud‟s Civilization 





and/or misunderstand. Given the fact that people subscribing to all manner of ethical 
theories (or lack thereof) are afflicted with pathological states, it would be completely 
uncalled for, for Psychoanalysis to endorse or condemn any of them11. The ethical 
undercurrent of Psychoanalysis thus remained unspoken, inheriting the signature 
cynicism of Sigmund Freud, who denied any formalizable relation of human goodness 
to actuality. Like all cynics, however, Freud was a fallen idealist. His hopes for humanity 
remained too fragile to withstand the severe and degrading blows dealt to them by the 
cruelty of historical contingency. Reality is blighted, impossible to reconcile with 
goodness and truth, leading to its interpretation as inherently unjust and/or 
incommensurable with ideality, safely concealed behind a curtain of obscurity. Although 
he refers in a letter to Oskar Pfister to his often-disappointed “high ideal”, Freud 
mentions nothing but disappointment as to its actualization:  
I do not break my head very much about good and evil, but I have found little that 
is „good‟ about human beings on the whole […] no matter whether they publicly 
subscribe to this or that ethical doctrine or to none at all. […] If we are to talk of 
ethics, I subscribe to a high ideal from which most of the human beings I have 
come across depart most lamentably (PF, p. 61-2). 
                                                          
11
It will be argued in response that certain ethical positions are associated more closely with pathological states 
than others, and this may indeed be the case. When confronting a concrete situation in which morality has taken 
on a pathological character, however, we must always remember that pathological ethics are not un-ethical, but 
pre-ethical. Any attempt to uproot or encourage specific ethical doctrines would lead to the creation of 
interminable political and/or religious entanglements, which do a great deal to prevent any therapeutic effect from 
occurring, and discredit Psychoanalytic practice in general. Rather, in the same sense that bodily medicine is both 
politically and religiously neutral, so should Psychoanalysis be. Freud’s writing on religion, for instance, should not 
be taken as advocacy for atheism but as a diagnosis of the potentially destructive aspects of religion when it is 
blended with psychopathology. This is why I have focused on the treatment of pathological egoism in this thesis. 
The ego, treated as an imaginary construct, provides a neutral meeting ground for the psychological treatment of 





Here, we see perhaps the most explicit mention in the entire Freudian corpus of Freud‟s 
underlying moral idealism and its obscure but undeniable relation to his far more easily 
identifiable pessimism about humanity. It‟s no secret that Freud held out little hope that 
humans would ever recover from their conniving, chaotic, and hedonistic ways. For one 
reason or another, he chose to keep his hopes to himself. Perhaps we thought that 
expressing them would have been unprofessional.  I propose that this idealism is in 
reality a silent precursor to Psychoanalysis writ large, and has its clearest manifestation 
in the cathartic method Freud employed at early stages. Later, his increasing concern 
with the delineation of pathological states resulted in a neglect of his motivating aims, 
which would likely have guided his work in a different direction. This ideality continued in 
latency throughout psychoanalytic thought to this day, in the form of an unspoken 
idealism, a reluctant idealism that, in its hesitancy to misrepresent reality, has given the 
impression of being a cynicism which has led to a great deal of unwarranted backlash 
from critics. I am attempting to develop this idealistic direction to bring it out into the 
open a little more, in order to produce a therapeutic effect on ethical thought, which is in 
our times caught in a deadlock between various conflicting prescriptive schemas. 
 The catharsis of the ego leads us beyond deadlock. What it does lead us to has 
various titles in the literature (alterity, exteriority, difference, otherness, the absolute, the 
good, &c), all of them easily hypostatized, folded into new ego-objects, but never failing 
to stimulate the hopes of humanity for a better future, and faith in the necessity of 
progress. The process of hypostasis of ideality is predictable, even in its more playful 
variations, for instance, as in the case of alterity, as Levinas points out:  “Right off, a 





solidifications of radical desires aimed in the first place beyond their source. In the ego, 
these desires find a stable place to enter the repetitive circuit of identity, in which they 
can return eternally, giving off the illusion of being different each time. This illusion must 
persist, to obscure the irreducible banality of an all-encompassing stasis.  
 Even the term “catharsis” itself has often become little more than a catchphrase 
referring first and foremost to a specific spectrum of violent and/or sexual expression, 
whose supposedly transgressive content has become more acceptable for the masses 
than the activity which supposedly repressed it. The life and death instincts, 
universalized in the forms of violent and sexual entertainment, reduced to trite 
predictability, offer no outlet for the infinitely aporetic processes of the human mind. 
Catharsis, if it is to live up to its title, must present us with a route towards a true 
alternative, and a plausible one. It must not merely accelerate the frequency at which 
one suppressive schema replaces another, sweeping everything up in its process. It 
must not merely find a more stable schematic to more smoothly accommodate the 
world. It must open out onto reality itself.           
 In the context of our material lives, in a literal sense, nothing is ever supposed to 
be the same. No two shapes or numbers are identical as soon as they are materially 
inscribed. Yet banality comes forth so easily. If all were purely material, there would only 
be difference, (or otherness, exteriority &c), and banality would be impossible to detect. 
It is only the persistence of the embodied ego, which allows for a feeling of return, the 
very return which Freud termed “cathexis”. It has long been known, however, that this 
ego is imaginary, and the only dispute appears to revolve around how necessary it is to 





universalize it, turning the entirety of the cosmos into its mirror (called “the holographic 
universe”, by Michael Talbot). The genesis of the cathexes, which make the ego 
identifiable, does not itself occur in the ego, which is by nature contentless. 
 Catharsis involves a reference or gesture towards ethics because the purging of 
the ego‟s hermetic self-enclosure results in a confrontation with reality as a newfound 
exteriority, which is undeniably an opening on to the possibility of the good. It is on this 
level that I make a departure from traditional psychoanalytic theory, which posits reality 
as inherently traumatic, in a morally neutral sense. If one is willing to set aside the 
biases inherent to cynicism that run rampant throughout theories of the mind, it is easy 
to understand. The argument I put forth against this perennially fashionable cynical 
impulse towards reality is very simple, but I believe it is effective.  
 It is always a safe assumption to make, that reality (truth) is always better than 
illusion (falsity). Naturally, the rebuttal to this claim will be that sometimes it is preferable 
for the truth to remain hidden. Contained within this rebuttal, there is a deep 
misunderstanding. One‟s reason for hiding the truth is always in the interest of 
something thought to be better. Now imagine, hypothetically, that this hiding of the truth 
were not necessary to achieve the desired end. Would it not then be preferable to reach 
this end without concealing the truth? In the classic example of a murderer who comes 
to one‟s house in search of victims, who asks where to find them, for instance, would it 
not be preferable to tell the truth to the murderer, but in such a manner that no violence 
would result? If such a thing were possible, it would be a miracle in the truest sense, 
and the highest form of morality, being all the better for having involved no lies. Once 





reality, which supposedly forces us to constantly make moral compromises, it is easy to 
see that truth/reality is a virtue and a good before it is an abusive trauma. Now, I do not 
intend to go so far as to argue that truth/reality is the highest good, but merely that it is a 
good wherever it occurred. No degradation has ever occurred through the discovery of 
truth/reality. If the discovery of truth/reality activates an immoral chain of events, the 
truth-teller cannot be blamed for the immoral outcome, but only perhaps for not having 
told enough of the truth, which includes not only the factual details of a situation, but the 
meaning of it as a whole. Partial truths can, it is doubtless, be harmful, but they are 
precisely harmful because of their partiality, not because of their truthfulness. 
 It is only when truth and reality are separated from meaning that they become 
fearsomely traumatic or evil, and solidify into pathology. This is the reason why events 
are often so much more horrifying before we discover the context in which they 
occurred. Contextualization always has the effect of producing meaning, and at its best, 
of remedying the chasms that open up in the course of life. With the passage of time, 
even things that seemed meaningless as they occurred gradually take on a well-defined 
role in the flow of things. This does not diminish the absurd trauma that overwhelmed 
the mind, but shows that even traumatism has a place in the development of the world.    
Of course, trauma can be expanded to cosmic proportions, but so can anything 
else. It is only in the context of the infinite that meaning becomes truly problematic. The 
reasons we discover to account for events become in this context flimsy and 
unconvincing. Especially in the context of Philosophical thought, which, from its very 
origins, has sought the eternal in the temporal, everything comes to take on an infinite 





infinite reality is separated from infinite meaning, it opens up the possibility for infinite 
trauma. The paradigm example of this phenomenon is post-idealistic modern 
philosophy, which, in both its existentialist and positivistic variants, denies any 
association between meaning and reality, in favor of an independent ego, immune to 
absorption by any categories larger than it is. 
As I discussed in chapter two, however, the ego comes into being in the first 
place at the site of a trauma, brought about by an excess of affectedness at an 
immature stage before the proper apparatuses are in place to allow for a meaningful 
response. The ego then forms imaginary cathexes in order to account for this helpless 
affectedness. These cathexes, however, hypostatize meaning, keep it self-referential, 
and prevent it from connecting to exteriority, or otherness. This leads to the whole of 
reality becoming potentially traumatic, because it is only encountered non-relationally.  
 Wherever illusion is transcended, there is an opportunity to encounter reality. 
This is why catharsis, as purgative of the illusions of the ego, leads directly to the door 
of ethics. In order for ethics to function, it is obvious that there must first be contact with 
reality. Any ethics unrelated to reality would be rendered completely incomprehensible, 
as reality itself is a necessary predicate of any fully developed ethics. The egoic 
imaginary, with its unified and illusive reflectivity is by nature pre-ethical. If ethics are to 
become possible, there must be a reference beyond this. There are perhaps many ways 
that this can be done, but I have found that the tactic which most adequately leads in 
this direction is that which has been described as “catharsis”. Through catharsis, the 
ego, following its purgation, can come to serve as a lens for the mind, which is all to 





that the mind is the same entity as consciousness. The truth is quite the contrary. The 
unconscious mind is still the mind, and the ego represents an infinitesimal vanishing 


























I will use the last few paragraphs here, to sum up the ground I have covered. In 
the first section of this paper (“The Problem of a Psychoanalytic Ethics”), I explored the 
possible misunderstandings of the nature of ethics, which lead to the erroneous 
conclusion that either Psychoanalytic theory is without an ethics, or what is worse, 
attempts to do away with them. I described two theoretical poles, which lead to this 
mistake. One pole leads to error through overparticularization of the ends of desire, 
refusing to recognize any desires other than those that have their origins in the object-
oriented drives of the individual, aimed at completing a particularity. This theoretical 
structure, typically attributed to Psychoanalysis (in some cases with good reason), leads 
to the reduction of ethics to a vanishing point. Following this approach, everything, 
whether idea, emotion, desire, or drive, is reduced to an atomistic component. It is 
unilaterally opposed to any thought of universality or cosmology. These atomistic 
components are incomprehensible, in every respect other than the pull they exert on the 
subject, which we can think of as the drive, the givenness of a predefined lack. On the 
opposite end of the spectrum, we see ethics expanded to a superstructure that perfectly 
delineates ethical norms and imposes guilt on any violations of them. This 
superstructure, by delimiting freedoms, also limits them to such a great degree that 
ethics can no longer be practiced freely, and consequently become impossible. Finally, 
it becomes clear that both of these methods for defining ethics ultimately diminish them. 
In the case of the universal and the particular, as well as any combination of the two, we 
find ourselves trapped in determinism, with no hope of understanding either what 





looked for ethics elsewhere, discovering that the relation between these two poles is 
one of anxiety, and this anxiety will point us to the location of a non-reductive ethics 
(beyond over-abstraction and over-particulatization).    
 In the second section of the paper (“The Formation of the Ego”), I explored the 
genesis of the ego, illustrating how the ego is in itself incapable of ethics, being in its 
essence pre-ethical. At early stages of development, the ego is incapable of functioning 
ethically, in that it oscillates between states of passivity and solipsism, and thereby 
cannot enter into any true relation outside of the imaginary superstructure that it either 
imposes or is imposed upon it. I understand the ego‟s genesis as revolving around the 
process of reflectivity, as described in the work of Jacques Lacan.  
The ego is generated to, through cathexes, reflect, and deflect excess impulses, 
but this very reflection and deflection can easily fill the entire ego. Eventually, however, 
the ego discovers the presence of a complete “object” outside of itself, which allows it to 
purge itself or else to be purged of cathexes, which allows for an encounter with 
otherness, instead of imaginatively imposing on it or receiving its impressions. The ego, 
purged of cathectic dross becomes less of a mirror than a space through which 
relationality occurs. This relationality freely flows between the universal and the 
particular, capable not only of interacting hierarchically, but immanently as well. It is this 
possibility of immanence which allows for ethical practice to be distinguished from mere 
authoritarianism (top-down ethic) or rebellion (bottom-up ethics). Similarly, it is what 
allows Psychoanalysis as a practice to be ethical without teaching ethics. The 
analysand, like any individual, must discover what goodness is for his or her self, for 





If the analyst were to give a gift the analysand, it would be a gift the analysand has paid 
for, and not only with money, but with time, effort, and perhaps a great deal of 
psychological trauma. One does not pay for a gift. The giver can expect nothing in 
return.  
 In the third and final section of the paper, I discuss the role of ethicality in 
general. After the catharsis (purgation) of the ego, we come to a confrontation with 
ethics itself. The role of Psychoanalysis then, concerning ethics is to reference to them 
through its very ethicality. In truth, this reference towards ethics is not strictly the work of 
Psychoanalysis, but any work that seeks what is good. At the end of the completion of 
any good work, one finds oneself together with the other, facing the other, as Levinas 
wrote in Ethics and Infinity: “in the interpersonal relationship it is not a matter of thinking 
the ego and the other together, but to be facing. The true union or true togetherness is 
not a togetherness of synthesis but a togetherness of the face to face” (p. 77). Ethics 
cannot make choices for us, but rather puts us in the position of being able to make 
ethical decisions, in the same way that, more broadly, Philosophy at large “does not 
indicate a choice, but articulates the situation of being „in the position of making a 
choice‟” (Raffoul, p. 2).  
Every institution, whether university, psychoanalytic, business, politics, family, &c, is 
incapable of enforcing ethicality, but must instead aim towards bringing its subjects to 
the point at which they may come to the position of being able to practice ethics in the 
true sense.  Ethical practice must not force goodness out into the world, but promote the 
building of a capacity to receive goodness from wherever it may come, all the while 





likewise can only be truly received through a willingness to give. Ego-fixation results in 
an inability to do either. A young child cannot do good or evil, because s/he remains 
fixated on the reversibility of relation. It is the goal of ethicality to bring us to maturity, 
and the ability to act freely. Although Psychoanalysis is far from being the only theory 
and/or institution to be ethical in this sense, it is through our exploration of its bleak and 
often unnerving implications that we may learn to confront the greater traumas we can 
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